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ABSTRACT 
 
B2B e-commerce has fundamentally changed the way in which an organization 
purchases goods/service.  Nowadays, the adoption of e-procurement, which means 
the electronic acquisition of goods/service, has been prevalent in supply chain 
management. A variety of supplier selection models have been developed in supply 
chain management literature. In this research, an adaptive supplier selection 
mechanism is proposed to help buyers evaluate suppliers in an e-marketplace. A 
Multi-Agent System simulation package of Repast is used to create a realistic 
environment where different kinds of suppliers and buyers equipped with the 
proposed selection model can interact so as to study the performance of the 
proposed selection model.  We evaluate three supplier selection models and find 
that our proposed model outperforms the other two in terms of robustness and 
performance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
B2B e-commerce has fundamentally changed the way in which an organization 
purchases goods/service.  Nowadays, the adoption of e-procurement, which means 
the electronic acquisition of goods/service, has been prevalent in supply chain 
management. There are different types of e-procurement systems on the market. 
For example, public e-markets such as W.W. Grainger, Aribra; consortia-based e-
markets such as E2Open in the electronic industry, or private e-markets run by 
either supplier or buyer (e.g., Motorola, or GE).  B2B Marketplaces can also be 
classified as horizontal or vertical in terms of materials transacted in the e-
procurement system. Horizontal marketplaces involve buyers or suppliers from 
different industries exchanging maintenance, repairs and operations (MRO) 
materials; while vertical marketplace involve buyer and suppliers from same 
industries exchanging direct materials such as strategic components or commodity 
products. In this paper, we are interested in studying buyer-side marketplace where 
the buyer needs to purchase commodity products or MRO materials from multiple 
suppliers. Because suppliers are heterogeneous, we aim to design an adaptive 
supplier selection mechanism to meet the buyer’s needs.  
 
Supplier selection has been extensively studied in supply chain management. 
Criteria considered in supplier selection are critical to the success of supply 
management. In the past, factors such as price, delivery, quality and service were 
valued in supplier selection.  However, due to increased supply chain complexity 
and uncertainty, price is no longer the most critical factor (Wu and Weng, 2010), 
but other factors such as on-time performance, supply flexibility, product design 
collaboration capability, supplier viability and low-carbon footprint (Govindan & 
Sivakumar, 2016) also need to be assessed in today’s supply chain environment.  
Based on supply chain operations reference (SCOR) model developed by supply 
chain council (SCC), Huang and Keskar (2007) comprehensively classified 
performance metrics for supplier selection into seven categories, namely reliability, 
responsiveness, flexibility, cost and financial, assets and infrastructure, safety, and 
environment.  Sen et al. (2008) developed a hierarchical criteria structure for 
supplier selection, which includes qualitative and quantitative attributes such as 
cost, quality, service, reliability, management and organization, and technology. 
Pan & Choi (2016) proposed an two-phase agent-based negotiation model to study 
a fashion supply chain, where due-date and price are two criteria to find Pareto 
solution under cooperative and competitive phases.  In recent years, due to the 
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environmental and sustainability awareness, green criteria has also been 
incorporated into the decision of supplier selection (Genovese et al. 2013, Jain et 
al. 2016)   
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A variety of supplier selection models have been developed in supply chain 
management literature. Lee and Ou-Yang (2007) reviewed supplier selection 
methodologies till 2007. These methodologies include mixed integer programming, 
simulation, experiment, fuzzy programming, genetic algorithm and agent 
technology, analytic hierarchy process (AHP), etc.  Later on, Ravindran et al. 
(2010) summarized three clusters of supplier selection models: the first cluster is 
multi-objective mathematical programming methods; the second cluster is game 
theoretic methods and the third cluster is the applications of artificial intelligence 
on supplier selections.  In their invited review, Ho et al. (2010) surveyed two 
different approaches to supplier evaluation and selection: individual approaches 
and integrated approaches. Individual approaches includes data envelopment 
analysis, mathematical programming, analytic hierarchy process, analytic network 
process, fuzzy set theory, simple multi-attribute rating technique (SMART), and 
genetic algorithm. Integrated approaches includes integrated AHP approaches, 
integrated fuzzy approaches, other approaches such as integrated ANN and case-
based reasoning (CBR), integrated ANN and GA, integrated DEA and SMART.   
For example,  Bai and Sarkis (2010) integrated sustainability into supplier selection 
process, where they adopted multi-stage, multi-method approach and utilized grey 
system and rough set theory to evaluate supplier selection decisions.  Based on basic 
data envelopment analysis (DEA), Wu and Blackhurst (2009) proposed an 
augmented DEA methodology to rank suppliers.  In this enhanced model, they 
incorporated virtual standards and the weight constraints. Che (2010) constructed a 
mathematical model for assembly sequence planning (ASP) multi-period supplier 
selection problem in order to minimize the integrated criteria, and a hybrid heuristic 
algorithm, referred to as guided-Pareto genetic algorithm (Gu-PGA) was developed 
to find satisfactory solution. Wu et al. (2007) applied bootstrap simulation 
technique to evaluate supplier’s process capability indices, and compared 
performance among different bootstrap methods and supplier selection power.  
Sevkli (2010) proposed a fuzzy technique known as ELECTRE for supplier 
selection decision drawing on a real Turkish industry case. Ghorbani et al. (2013) 
integrated quality management tool into supplier selection and proposed a three-
phase approach based on the Kano model and fuzzy MCDM.  Yu et al. (2017) also 
considered the synergy effect affecting the choice of supplier selection. They 
proposed an agent-based negotiation model to automate multi-product supplier 
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selection problem. Other most research has combined the above mentioned 
methodologies.    
 
One common limitation of the models mentioned above is the decisions cannot be 
dynamically adjusted based on the updated information, which is pivotal in today’s 
e-business environment.  Therefore, in this paper we are trying to design a dynamic 
online multi-criterion supplier selection mechanism, by which buyers can 
dynamically update the due parameters, adapt to the changing environment and 
obtain the decent outcome based on the on-going performance of the suppliers in 
term of quality and flexibility. 
 
We have borrowed the same concept and design of the multi-agent system used in 
You and Sikora (2011) and applied it to a different context of supplier selection in 
this paper. Instead of sellers with feedback ratings in the traditional consumer 
markets as in You and Sikora we have suppliers in this new context who supply 
with varying quality and flexibility.  
  
SUPPLIER EVALUATION IN E-PROCUREMENT 
ENVIRONMENT 
 
In contrast to traditional procurement, how to evaluate and select suppliers in the e-
procurement system is more challenging due to more uncertainty and risk involved 
in the whole procurement process. Typically, buyer’s online requisitions are 
generated by applications like inventory, work in process (WIP), advanced supply 
chain planning and order management system. Afterwards, an online request for 
quotation (RFQ) is announced, and eligible suppliers respond to the RFQ, this is 
referred to as quotations. One supplier is then selected to transact business from all 
the quotations. Among all criteria of supplier selection, price is the easiest one for 
suppliers to comply with and thus price has the lowest importance (Bottani and 
Rizzi, 2005); however other criteria such as quality or flexibility is not observed by 
the buyer till the product is delivered, and may cause significant cost to the buyer.  
Therefore in this paper, we assume the price is not a criterion considered in the 
evaluation process. In other words, all eligible suppliers in the e-procurement 
system offer the same price based on spot market price, which is especially true for 
MRO materials. Instead, we are interested in two supplier criteria in the B2B e-
procurement environment, 1) product quality; 2) supplier flexibility. Quality of the 
product criteria in the e-procurement system is usually the quality of conformance, 
i.e., the degree to which goods or service conform to the specification by supplier. 
Supply flexibility refers to the supplier’s ability to respond to buyer’s changing 
requirements of purchased materials in terms of volume, mix and delivery date 
(Tachizawa and Gimenez, 2009). We also assume the buyer periodically purchases 
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standard products, and demand is stochastic.  After each transaction, the buyer 
dynamically updates supplier performance and establishes an adaptive supplier 
selection mechanism. Supplier selection over the Internet can reduce buyers’ costs 
of search, communication and evaluation for standard products (Barua et al. 1997).  
However, how to manage supply risk in e-procurement environment is a challenge. 
Specifically, in this research, we assume all suppliers respond to RFQ or post the 
same bidding price (Posted value, or PV ); however when they come to deliver the 
service/goods, two attributes of supplier section varies. The first is the product 
quality. When suppliers deliver the service/goods, quality could be either high or 
low.  We use delivered value ( DV ) to measure the intrinsic quality of the delivered 
goods.  The difference between DV and PV ( PVDV  )is used to measure the 
supply uncertainty in terms of quality.  The buyer will be better off if the value of 
PVDV  is positive, or will be highly likely to incur a loss if the value PVDV   
is negative.  Therefore when a buyer makes decision on supplier selection, this 
value difference is used as an attribute to evaluate the performance of different 
suppliers. 
 
The second attribute is supply flexibility, which measures the supplier’s ability to 
respond to changes in demand or other requirements such as delivery time. 
Similarly, suppliers’ flexibility could be high or low.  High supply flexibility means 
the supplier is more responsive and agile to meet the needs of the buyers, which is 
critical for managing supply chain risks or exceptions. 
 
There can be other important attributes that can influence the selection process; we 
can also include these attributes in our proposed model as in Fig.1.  For simplicity 
purpose, we will only consider the quality and flexibility attributes in the following 
simulation.  
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Figure 1: Dynamic supplier selection model based on quality and flexibility 
 
SIMULATION DESIGN 
 
In this study, Multi-Agent System simulation package of Repast J (North, Collier, 
& Vos, 2006) is adopted to build a realistic E-Procurement environment where 
different kinds of suppliers and buyers equipped with the proposed selection model 
can interact with each other so as to study the performance of the proposed selection 
model.    
 
This e-procurement environment is composed of supplier agents (suppliers), buyer 
agents (buyers), a Bulletin Board (BB) and a computational module.  The suppliers 
and buyers can interact with each other. The BB is the place where a buyer 
announces RFQ, suppliers respond to RFQ and the buyer posts the data of the 
transaction result with the selected supplier.  The computational module does the 
necessary computations using data from the BB for a buyer to select a supplier in 
an upcoming transaction.  Numerous iterations of above-mentioned interactions go 
on in the multi-agent system to simulate the functioning of an e-procurement  
environment.  Each iteration is made of several steps.  First, buyers generate 
demand following a demand equation and announce the RFQ via the BB; then the 
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suppliers responds to the RFQ on the BB; after that each buyer selects a supplier 
based on the proposed selection model and the prior performance of the supplier to 
initiate transactions with the selected supplier; and then  the supplier reveals the 
results of the transaction to the buyer; finally the buyer posts the data of the 
transaction result via the BB.  Within each iteration the sequence of transactions is 
inconsequential; since only the data of transactions from fifty preceding iterations 
are utilized to select the due suppliers.  
 
To simulate a more diverse set of suppliers in the selection environment, the 
following four kinds of suppliers are considered in simulation: Q0.8F0.8 suppliers, 
Q0.6F0.6 suppliers, Q0.4F0.4 suppliers, and Q0.2F0.2 suppliers.  The notation of 
these suppliers indicates their propensity to provide high quality and highly flexible 
service. For example, Q0.8F0.8 suppliers provide high quality service 80% of the 
time and highly flexible service 80% of the time.      
 
To quantify the quality and flexibility of a transaction from both the buyer’s and 
supplier’s perspective, we model the intrinsic quality value of the transacted goods 
based on two terms: delivered quality value (DV) and posted quality value (PV); 
and the intrinsic flexibility value of the transaction based on two terms: the mean 
respond rate of the due industry and the actual respond rate of a transaction. The 
PV is similar to the listed price of an item but in our model it captures the expected 
“value” in quality that is being offered by the supplier.  The DV is the actual quality 
“value” delivered to the buyer at the end of the transaction and models the 
satisfaction of the buyer with the product’s quality.  When a supplier is cooperative 
in term of quality, the supplier provides a DV that is equal to or more than the 
corresponding PV.  In the simulation experiments, the DV is drawn from a normal 
distribution and keeps concealed from the buyer until after the transaction is 
finished. The mean of DV for high-quality service is set to be greater than the PV 
and the mean of DV for low-quality service to a value less than the PV.  When a 
supplier is cooperative in term of flexibility, the supplier will provide the goods 
with a respond rate (RR) greater than the industry mean respond rate.  In our 
simulation experiments, the respond rate is drawn from a normal distribution and 
also remains unknown to the buyer until after the transaction is done.  
 
When designing the simulation framework, we assume the buyer’s demand is 
stochastic, which follows )1(AR  time series process (e.g., Box et al. 1994): 
  
Journal of International Technology and Information Management  Volume 26, Number 2 2017 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017 101  ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
 
 
ttt dd   10 ,  ),0(~
2
0 Nt ,  1 ,   (1) 
where td is the demand at period t,   is a constant, t  is the white noise.  
 
The buyer in our simulation experiments uses the proposed model to calculate each 
supplier’s forecasted integrated gain (FIG) from both quality and flexibility factors 
of previous transactions. Then a buyer selects a supplier based on the calculated 
suppliers’ FIG values.  In the real world other factors might also affect the selection 
of a supplier, such as, reliability, price, safety and reputation, etc.   For instance, a 
buyer might be willing to buy from a supplier with less than the highest FIG if the 
item is being sold with more attractive incentive provided by the supplier, such as 
discount, safety and/or reliability.  Since our focus in this paper is the use of the 
proposed supplier selection  model, we model this trade-off between the FIG of a 
supplier and other factors by using a Boltzmann distribution (Kaelbling, Littman, 
& Moore , 1996) for selecting a supplier.  Boltzmann distribution is widely used in 
Reinforcement Learning techniques like Softmax (Sutton, R.S., & Barto, A.G., 
1998), and it allocates a probability for each supplier as follows: 
 
0    where)Pr(
1
/)(/)(  



n
i
sFIGsFIG
j
ij ees ,                                (2) 
 
where Pr(sj) is the probability of selecting the supplier sj, FIG(si) is the FIG value 
of supplier si, and   is the temperature constant. With this method, a buyer is able 
to both exploit its knowledge about the suppliers’ FIG values and explore potential 
good suppliers in terms of all other factors except for quality and flexibility. At very 
high temperatures the method approaches a random search i.e., all the suppliers are 
selected with equal probability.  At very low temperatures the method approaches 
a greedy search i.e., only the supplier with the best FIG value is selected.  Thus the 
temperature constant is controlled to model the above-mentioned trade-off between 
FIG value and other factors. For example, a buyer who is willing to buy in favor of 
factors other than quality and flexibility from suppliers with sub-par FIG value 
would set the temperature constant at a higher value compared to a quality-and-
flexibility favoring buyer who prefers buying from only well-known good suppliers 
in terms of quality and flexibility. In the experiments, buyers’ and suppliers’ gains 
are used to measure the performance of the proposed model in the selection 
environment. The buyer’s gain includes two parts, which are the gain from quality 
(
qGB ) and gain from flexibility ( fGB ).  qGB  in a transaction is defined as the 
product of the demand and the difference between the DV and the PV: 
 
                        tt
q
t dPVDVGB )(  .                                                     (3) 
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And the fGB   in a transaction is defined as: 
 
           







    0  if               *)(
    0  if                  *)(
2
2
rrdPVrrc
rrdPVrrc
GB
tb
tbf
t ,                     (4) 
  
where bc  is the coefficient of the loss function for the buyer and r  is the respond 
rate of the supplier in a transaction and r  is the industry mean respond rate.  When 
r  is greater than r , it means the supplier’s respond rate is higher than the industry 
average, so the buyer is gaining on the transaction due to higher than average 
flexibility it receives.  Like the buyer, the supplier’s gain ( GS ) also includes the 
two parts, the gain from quality (
q
tGS ) and the gain from flexibility ( 
f
tGS ).  The 
gross profit of a supplier from quality factor is defined as mPV, where m (<1) is the 
profit margin. The gain for a supplier from quality factor depends on the DV, the 
demand in transactions and is given by: 
 
tt
q
t dDVPVmPVGS *)]([  .                                             (5) 
 
A supplier can therefore gain more by providing a DV that is less than the PV. A 
supplier can gain less than the gross profit by providing a DV that is better than the 
PV.   
And
fGS  in a transaction is defined as : 
 







         0)( if                   *)(
0)( if                 *)(
2
2
rrdPVrrc
rrdPVrrc
GS
tttts
ttttsf
t ,                   (6) 
 
where sc  is the constant of the loss function for the supplier and r  is the respond 
rate of the supplier in a transaction and r  is the industry mean respond rate.  When 
r  is greater than r , the supplier is losing on the transaction, by providing more 
flexibility with a respond rate higher than the industry mean respond rate.  We 
assume that no supplier would conduct a transaction that incurs a loss, i.e., 
 
 0
f
t
q
tt GSGSGS  .    (7) 
 
The tDV  is drawn from a normal distribution with a standard deviation of   and a 
mean of PVg)1(   for high quality service and a mean of PVg)1(   for low quality 
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service, where g (<1) is a constant. Since with more than 95% of the probability, 
the actual value of tDV  falls within two standard deviations of the mean, the 
maximum and minimum values of tDV  can be approximated as: 
 
2)1(max  PVgDV ,                                              (8) 
2)1(min  PVgDV .                                                (9) 
 
The respond rate ( tr ) is drawn from another normal distribution with a standard 
deviation of ’ and a mean of rh)1(   for more flexible service and a mean 
of (1- h) r  for less flexible service, where h  (<1) is a constant.  Since with more 
than 95% of the probability the actual value of tr  falls within two standard deviation 
of the mean, the maximum and minimum value of tr  can also be approximated as: 
 
  2)1(max rhr ,    (10) 
  2)1(min rhr .    (11) 
 
We also assume that when high-quality service is provided the actual tDV  is never 
less than the PV and when low-quality service is provided, the actual tDV  is never 
greater than the PV . Similarly, when more flexible service is provided the actual 
tr is never less than the r  and when less flexible service is provided the actual tr  is 
never greater than the r ,i.e., 
 
 
 2)1(2)1(  PVgPVPVg ,                        (12) 
   2)1(2)1( rhrrh .    (13) 
By Eq. (12), we get, 
 
2
gPV
 .      (14) 
By Eq. (13) , we get, 
 
2
rh
 .      (15) 
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When tDV  is highest and tr  is greater than r , the LHS of Eq.(7) has the smallest 
value.  Combining equations (6), (7), (8) and (10) we get: 
 
PVc
PVgm
rr
s
t
2)(
)( 2

 ,      (16) 
PVc
PVgm
rr
PVc
PVgm
r
s
t
s
 2)(2)( 


 .  (17) 
Since 0)( 2  rrt , it implies that 2)(  PVgm , i.e., 
                                         
2
)( PVgm 
 .                                                            (18) 
Since > 0, it also implies that m > g. The above equations are used to determine  
values for the constants m and g, and for the standard deviations  and ’. Using 
the maximum and minimum values of tDV from equations (8) and (9) we further 
get the following inequality for the value of tDV : 
 
 2)1(2)1(  PVgDVPVg t .                            (19) 
 
From (6), we have  
 
      '2)1( r when , *)'2)1(()( t
2
max   rhdPVrrhcGS ts
f
t  (20) 
and,
 
       '2)1( r when , *)'2)1((-   )( t
2
min   rhdPVrrhcGS ts
f
t . (21) 
 
Combining equations(5), (7), (8) and (21) we get, 
 
2
)'2()( 2 PVrhcPVgm s 

 .
                          (22) 
 
In our simulation, all the parameter values were determined by either complying 
with standard simulation practices or conducting informal sensitivity analysis. For 
example, in order to find the temperature constant τ in Boltzmann’s distribution 
(Eq. 2), which controls the trade-off between the FIG value and other factors in 
selecting suppliers, we applied a sensitivity analysis with three values for τ = 0.02, 
0.2, and 2 and determined that τ = 0.2 resulted in the best trade-off. 
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There were 24 buyers, and 8 suppliers, of which 2 suppliers of each type (Q0.8F0.8, 
Q0.6F0.6, Q0.4F0.4, Q0.2F0.2) in all of our simulation experiments.  And the PV 
of the item was set at 8.0. The profit margin m was set at 0.3; the constant g was set 
at 0.2; the constant of h was set at 0.2; the average respond rate of r  was set at 0.5.  
The bc  and sc were set at 0.5 for Eqs. (4) and (6), respectively.  The standard 
deviation ( ’) for the respond rate of the supplier was set at 0.045 and r  was set 
to 0.5 to satisfy Eq.(15).  The standard deviation ( ) for the DV for the item was 
set at 0.295 to satisfy Eqs.(14),(18),(22). The 0 and 1 in Eq. (1) was set at 20 and 
0.2, respectively. 
 
When learning is adopted, a buyer selects suppliers based on these suppliers 
performance in the previous immediate n periods in terms of 
q
tGB  and 
f
tGB .  For 
each supplier, the forecast integrity gain value (FIG) is calculated first, and then 
Boltzmman algorithm (Kaelbling, Littman & Moore, 1996) is adopted to select a 
supplier.  Boltzmman algorithm assigns high probability to suppliers with higher 
FIG values. The FIG at tick t in term of  
q
tGB  and 
f
tGB  is calculated as follows: 
 
fq
f
t
nti
f
q
t
nti
q
aa
volume
GBNormalized
a
volume
dGBNormalize
a
tFIG


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

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
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 where 
q
t
nti
dGBNormalize


1
 is the sum of  normalized gain of all buyers in term of 
quality from the evaluated supplier in the previous n periods; 
f
t
nti
GBNormalized


1
 
is the sum of normalized gain of all buyers in terms of flexibility from the evaluated 
supplier in the previous n periods; volume is the number of items traded between 
the evaluated supplier and all buyers in the previous n periods, qa  and fa  are the 
learnt coefficients for quality gain and flexibility gain parts, respectively.  
 
The coefficients are learnt by a buyer using the following equation; 
 
))(()()1(
1
volume
dGBNormalize
tGBNormalizedtata
q
t
nti
qqqq


   and (24) 
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where fq  ,  are the learning rates for aq and af, respectively. )(tGBNormalized q
and )(tGBNormalized f are the normalized quality gain and normalized flexibility 
gain of the buyer from the transaction between the evaluated supplier and the buyer 
at tick t, respectively. The following parameters and values are used in all the 
experiments: 
 
Notation Description Value 
m  Profit margin for supplier 0.3 
g The deviation control constant of DV 0.2 
PV Posted value of the item in unit in term of quality 8 
DV Delivered value of the item in unit in term of quality  
σ STD of the DV 0.295 
r The respond rate in a transaction of the supplier   
r  The average respond rate in the designated industry 0.5 
h The deviation control constant of the respond rate 0.2 
cs  The constant for the supplier’s loss function 0.5 
σ' The STD of the respond rate of a supplier 0.045 
cb The constant for the buyer’s loss function 0.5 
0  Constant in equation(1) 20 
   Constant in equation (1) 0.2 
n 
The number of immediate previous periods used to 
calculate FIG value 50 
 
In next section we present the results of the simulation experiments testing the 
performance of the proposed selection model. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
BASE CASE 
We first carry out simulation experiments comparing the following supplier 
selection models: Traditional, Static and Dynamic. In the Traditional model, which 
is the a benchmark the buyer checks whether the supplier selection in the previous 
Journal of International Technology and Information Management  Volume 26, Number 2 2017 
©International Information Management Association, Inc. 2017 107  ISSN: 1941-6679-On-line Copy 
 
iteration improved its gain.  If it did then it selects the same supplier.  If it did not 
improve the buyer’s gain then it randomly picks another supplier. On iteration 0 it 
picks a supplier randomly and picks the same supplier on iteration 1. From iteration 
2 it follows the rule mentioned above. For the Static model, we use a fixed set of 
coefficients aq and af to calculate FIG in eq. (23). For the Dynamic model, we use 
learning to dynamically adapt the coefficients aq and af  using eq. (24) and (25). 
The simulation is run for 1000 iterations and the average gain over the last 100 
iterations is recorded. Each experiment is then repeated 10 times, and the average 
of those 10 runs is reported in the results. 
 
The goal of an ideal supplier selection model should be to maximize the gains of 
buyers and suppliers who provide higher quality and flexibility, like Q0.8F0.8 
suppliers. At the same time, it should also penalize the lower quality and flexible 
suppliers like Q0.4F0.4 and Q0.2F0.2 suppliers to discourage such suppliers from 
dominating the marketplace.  
 
Table 1 presents the results comparing the relative performance of the three supplier 
selection models on the buyer gain as well as the different suppliers’ gain. It shows 
that while the Static model is better than the Traditional model, the Dynamic model 
is the best in terms of improving the gains for the buyers and the suppliers with 
higher quality and flexibility while penalizing those suppliers with lower quality 
and flexibility. The table also gives the results of paired-t test to show that all the 
improvements are statistically significant. The Dynamic model is able to increase 
the buyer’s gain over the Traditional model by more than 500% while increasing it 
by more than 15% over the Static model. It increases the higher quality supplier’s 
gain by more than 85% and 20% respectively over the Traditional and Static 
models. We plot the same results in figures 2 and 3 showing the relative 
improvement brought on by the Dynamic model over the traditional and static 
models on the buyer’s gain and the high quality supplier (Q0.8F0.8). The error bars 
in the plot show the variability in the results. Figure 4 shows the same result for the 
lower quality supplier (Q0.2F0.2) demonstrating that the dynamic model is the best 
in penalizing lower quality suppliers. 
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Table 1. Relative performance of different supplier selection models for base 
case 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Performance of buyer’s gain under base case 
Supplier Selection 
Models 
    Suppliers’ Gain 
  
Buyer’s 
Gain 
Q0.8F
0.8 
Q0.6F
0.6 
Q0.4F
0.4 
Q0.2F
0.2 
Traditional 
Avg 47.76 244.15 308.51 370.72 411.27 
Std/A
vg 7.51 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.53 
Static 
Avg 260.06 378.80 323.52 251.09 168.93 
Std/A
vg 1.44 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.77 
Pw/Tr
ad 3.49E-05 
2.49E-
06 n.s. 
3.10E-
07 
1.05E-
09 
Dynamic 
Avg 301.10 456.92 312.05 193.67 118.65 
Std/A
vg 1.34 0.73 0.79 0.82 0.93 
Pw/Tr
ad 1.27E-06 
2.08E-
09 n.s. 
6.43E-
08 
1.22E-
11 
Pw/St
at 9.20E-02 
4.06E-
04 n.s. 
4.98E-
04 
8.01E-
05 
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Figure 3. Performance of Q0.8F0.8 supplier’s gain under base case 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Performance of Q0.2F0.2 supplier’s gain under base case 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
For validity of the results and to ensure that the results are not an artifact of certain 
parameter values, we carried out sensitivity analysis of various parameters. In all 
cases we found that the relative performance of the dynamic model did not change 
with the change in the parameter values. Below we present results for two such 
sensitivity analysis simulation experiments. 
 
Since in a realistic setting the past tick's (t-1) gain is usually not available 
immediately, it has to be estimated and there can be noise in that estimate. We 
carried out simulation experiments to test the robustness of the dynamic model in 
the presence of noisy estimates. In the first set of simulation experiments we 
consider adding positive noise of 10% of the average gain to the value of last tick’s 
gain that is used in any computation for the supplier selection. The actual gain 
values that are reported for performance results are not changed. In other words, 
the traditional model uses the noisy value of the gain from the past tick to decide 
whether to switch the supplier. For the dynamic and static models we use the noisy 
gain values in the FIG values computed using equation (23). In the second set of 
simulation experiments we add negative noise in the amount of 10% of the average 
gain.  
 
Tables 2 and 3 show the results comparing the relative performance of the three 
supplier selection models on the buyers gain as well as the different suppliers’ gain 
for the positive and negative noise, respectively. Although the individual gains of 
the buyer and suppliers change with the addition of the noise, the relative 
performance of both the static and dynamic models remains the same. This shows 
that the dynamic model is robust even in the presence of noise and not only provides 
the best gain for buyers and high quality suppliers but also is able to discriminate 
against and penalize low quality suppliers. 
 
Supplier Selection 
Models 
    Suppliers’ Gain 
  
Buyer’s 
Gain 
Q0.8F
0.8 
Q0.6F
0.6 
Q0.4F
0.4 
Q0.2F
0.2 
Traditional 
Avg 33.30 239.18 310.23 376.01 423.69 
Std/A
vg 10.75 0.81 0.74 0.64 0.52 
Static 
Avg 261.30 385.76 315.94 244.00 175.40 
Std/A
vg 1.41 0.74 0.73 0.70 0.76 
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Table 2. Relative Performance of Different Supplier Selection Models for 
Positive Noise 
 
 
Table 3. Relative Performance of Different Supplier Selection Models for 
Negative Noise 
 
 
Fig. 5 summarizes the performance of the three models in terms of the distribution 
of the total gain among the buyers and suppliers across three different scenarios 
including the base scenario, one with positive noise and one with the negative noise. 
The dynamic model not only provides the best gain for the buyers, but also is the 
most robust in the presence of noise. 
Pw/Tr
ad 1.94E-06 
1.05E-
07 n.s 
1.30E-
08 
6.37E-
10 
Dynamic 
Avg 302.94 450.32 311.89 208.82 108.43 
Std/A
vg 1.31 0.72 0.76 0.74 0.95 
Pw/Tr
ad 1.07E-07 
7.93E-
09 n.s 
4.08E-
09 
6.45E-
11 
Pw/St
at 7.26E-03 
1.96E-
05 n.s 
3.20E-
03 
1.36E-
05 
Supplier Selection 
Models 
    Suppliers’ Gain 
  
Buyer’s 
Gain 
Q0.8F
0.8 
Q0.6F
0.6 
Q0.4F
0.4 
Q0.2F
0.2 
Traditional Avg 67.38 240.42 311.53 360.94 402.13 
  
Std/A
vg 5.52 0.82 0.73 0.64 0.55 
Static Avg 247.62 390.26 320.78 254.18 169.57 
  
Std/A
vg 1.57 0.73 0.73 0.72 0.77 
  
Pw/Tr
ad 2.93E-06 
8.52E-
08 n.s 
6.28E-
07 
2.12E-
10 
Dynamic Avg 300.65 450.00 320.83 199.38 111.54 
  
Std/A
vg 1.34 0.72 0.74 0.78 0.98 
  
Pw/Tr
ad 1.47E-06 
2.41E-
08 n.s 
8.24E-
09 
8.88E-
10 
  
Pw/St
at 8.41E-03 
4.04E-
04 n.s 
1.39E-
04 
1.32E-
05 
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Figure 5. Distribution of total gain across models for different scenarios 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the research, a dynamic supplier selection model is proposed, which provides a 
robust mechanism for selecting high quality and highly flexible suppliers that is not 
easily affected by noisy estimates of the actual gain from previous iterations. And 
a multi-agent simulation system was created to simulate the interactions among 
buyers and suppliers in an E-Procurement marketplace to test the proposed model. 
The performance of the proposed dynamic model was compared to that of other 
competing models.  Results showed that the dynamic model outperformed other 
models in terms of rewarding buyers and desirable suppliers with better returns, in 
terms of identifying and discriminating against low quality and low flexible 
suppliers with less returns, and in terms of being robust in the presence of noise. 
 
LIMITATIONS 
 
There are several limitations of the model proposed here. First, it requires a 
centralized system that functions both as the repository of the past transaction data 
for the buyers and suppliers and as the computation center to periodically calculate 
the all the needed FIG values. Although it is not uncommon for a number of major 
E-Procurement marketplaces to provide such a centralized system, our model 
undoubtedly demands  tremendous computational resources based on the fact that 
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after each transaction the FIG values of each supplier has to be recalculated 
separately for each buyer.  Our solution is to design and implement a more efficient 
distributed system for this model in the future.  Finally, our study is limited to the 
investigation of how the use of a given supplier selection model influences the 
performance of the suppliers and buyers that are stick to one given strategy. 
However, one of the key purposes of the mechanism design is to change the agents’ 
behavior for better and encourage their cooperation.  Another limitation is that our 
experiment does not cover the cases of suppliers that are high quality and low 
performance or vice versa, since the preferred selection result would also relies on 
which factor is more important to the buyers.  As all simulation related researches, 
due to the limit of resources, a study cannot exhaust all possibilities in reality, it can 
only test and investigate the most interesting scenario. 
 
FUTURE WORK 
 
As mentioned in the limitations, we are to conduct more experiments to test other 
interesting scenario, such as situations with the presence of high-quality-and-
low- performance suppliers plus the low-quality-and-high-performance suppliers to 
see if the proposed model still outperform other models.  We consider studying the 
potential impact of different levels of noise on the performance of the proposed 
model.  We also consider comparing the performance of the proposed model with 
other promising selection models in the E-Procurement marketplace.  We are to 
take population ecology approach to see the evolution of the behavior of suppliers 
and buyers to determine which model works the best to lead to the cooperation 
among the suppliers and buyers.  For instance, the suppliers could dynamically 
choose a strategy and switch from being high quality to low quality or vice versa, 
if it helps improve their gain, or the strategic suppliers could dynamically determine 
when and how to alter their flexibility. The buyers could also be designed more 
adaptive by allowing them to learn other parameters, for example, the temperature 
constant in Boltzmann distribution to improve their profit. 
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